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BACK TO THE CRIB?
William B. Stoebuck*
First, let me note that this Rembe Lecture honors Toni Rembe, Esq., a
distinguished graduate of this law school, class of 1960. Toni and I
knew each other as fellow students and members of the Washington Law
Review, since I was class of 1959. After graduating here, she took a
Master of Laws in taxation at New York University in 1961. Then she
joined the premier San Francisco law firm of Pillsbury, Madison &
Sutro, where she has long been the head of the tax law division. Toni,
who is a Seattle native, has maintained her ties to this city. Among her
other honors and positions, she is a director of Safeco Insurance
Company. Also, let me thank Toni's husband, Arthur Rock, for making
it possible for us to honor her today. He is a leading-we can without
exaggeration say "famous"--San Francisco venture capitalist, whose
generous gift funds the Rembe Lectureship.
In the rare book collection of the University of Washington law
library are several editions of the famous Year Books. Many of the socalled "black-letter" editions were published in England through the
centuries as late as 1679. But the original Year Books began in 1292 in
the reign of Edward I and continued annually until they abruptly ended
in 1535 during Henry VIII's reign. They are curious books, and there is
some mystery about their purposes. Essentially, they are notes of cases
argued in court. However, they generally give only the arguments of
counsel and the colloquies between counsel and the judges; rarely do
they give the court's decision and then only as a postscript.
Perhaps it is a coincidence, perhaps it is not, that systematic legal
education in England began in the same year as the Year Books began.
In that year King Edward issued a royal writ to the chief justice of
Common Pleas directing that "promising students" in each county be
appointed as "apprentices" to "follow the court and take part in its
business." These apprentices sat in a special area in the courtroom,
called the "crib," which I suppose is the origin of our expression "crib
notes." They took notes of the proceedings and on occasion were given
little lectures by the judges or even asked to give their opinion on some
matter. Maitland, the great legal historian, believed some of the
*Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
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apprentices' notes ended up in the early Year Books. It seems very likely
in any event that one purpose of the Year Books was to train apprentices
in pleading and argumentation.
By early in the fourteenth century the Inns of Court had begun. The
largest, Gray's, Lincoln's, Middle Temple, and Inner Temple, are still in
London today. There is some question about their original purpose, but
by mid-fourteenth century we find the apprentices as members of the
Inns, receiving instruction. The most famous fcrm of professional
instruction in the Inns was the mock trial, the "moats, endless moots."'
But by the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, the Inns had
really become universities, alternatives to Oxford or Cambridge. They
taught not only the profession of law, but history Eand even music and
dancing.2
It remains true in England today that legal education is conducted by
the profession.3 There are two separate professions, the barristers, who
are the courtroom gladiators, and the solicitors, whom we would call
office lawyers, though they handle trials up to a certain level. Every
barrister is a member of one of the Inns of Court. Solicitors are members
of the Law Society. The four Inns of Court, instead of having instruction
within each Inn as they did in the Middle Ages, now have gone together
to operate the Inns of Court Law School, which is located at Gray's Inn
in London. For budding solicitors, the Law Society operates the Law
Society College of Law. It is customary, though not strictly required,
that, before attending either the Inns of Court Law School or the Law
Society College of Law, a student have taken a three-year baccalaureate
degree at a university. The degree is often an undergraduate law degree,
an LL.B., but it may be some other kind of degree. However, the Inns of
Court and the Law Society prescribe a core curriculum of law courses
that students should have in university: contracts, torts, criminal law,

1. I credit Professor Samuel B. Thome, a great American scholar of English legal history, with the
quoted expression. He used it in his course in English Legal History in Harvard Law School in
1966, where I was privileged to be his student.
2. The sources for the early history of the Inns of Court are Theodcre F.T. Plucknett, Concise
History of the Common Law, 217-18, 224-38 (5th ed. 1956); Frederick Pollock & Frederic W.
Maitland, 1History of EnglishLaw, 216-17 (2d ed. 1898).
3. Following are sources relied upon in describing the current English system of legal education.
Roger C. Cramton, Preparationof Laimyers in England and the Unhed States: A Comparative
Glimpse, 10 Nova LJ.445 (1986) (a short, cursory overview); Sandra R. Klein, Legal Education in
the United States and England: A Comparative Analysis, 13 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.. 601
(1991) (lengthy, but not generally as useful as the Teeven article); Kevin M. Teeven, An American
Lawyer's View of English Legal Education, 11 N. Ky. L. Rev. 355 (1984) (most useful first-hand
observations by an American lawyer).
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land law, constitutional and administrative law, and trusts. If a student
has not had these six courses in university, then, before entering the Inns
of Court Law School or the Law Society College of Law, he or she must
take a nine-month preparatory course from the Inns or the Society. Thus,
the Inns and the Society impose course requirements on universities.
When a student has met the entry requirements, he or she must choose
whether to become a barrister or solicitor. If a barrister, then he or she
must become a member of one of the Inns. Then he or she will attend a
nine-month vocational course at the Inns of Court Law School. If the
student chooses to become a solicitor, then he or she must join the Law
Society and attend its nine-month vocational course.
Following
completion of the course in either the Inns of Court Law School or the
Law Society College of Law, the student must serve an apprenticeship or
clerkship in the office of a barrister or solicitor, as the case may be.
Finally, after all that, the new barrister or solicitor is admitted to practice
by his or her profession. Compared with the American system of legal
education, the English system is more practical, more vocational, and
much more controlled by the two legal professions.
American legal education has evolved along much different lines. In
colonial America, there was nothing comparable to the Inns of Court, no
law school of any kind. Our profession has never been divided into
barristers and solicitors; American lawyers have always handled both
office and courtroom practice. Almost from the beginning of the
colonies, there was a core of lawyers who had an English legal
education, either in the Inns of Court, in other so-called "equity inns"
that have since disappeared, or as solicitors. Only a handful of Englishtrained lawyers are known to have practiced in the colonies in the
seventeenth century, but the number increased at an increasing rate in the
eighteenth century up to the American Revolution.
By far most colonial lawyers were products of an apprenticeship
system, "reading law" in law offices. These apprentices might have any
kind of educational background, from no formal education to a good
college education at such colleges as Harvard, Yale, William and Mary,
Princeton, Queen's College (now Columbia), or Brown. Such a system
produced lawyers of wide-ranging ability, from crude pettifoggers to
ones well educated and thoroughly trained in the offices of fine lawyers.
George Wythe of Virginia, a great colonial lawyer who appears to have
been himself a product of the apprenticeship system, trained in his office
Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, James Madison, and James Monroe.
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So, the apprenticeship system could be very good cr very bad; quality
control was lacking.4
It was the lack of quality control, I think, that led to a demand for a
more assured system of education for the bar at the end of our colonial
period.' The first college venture into legal education was at William
and Mary, where George Wythe became professor of law in 1779.
Chancellor James Kent was elected to a chair of law at Columbia in
1793. Meantime, the first American professional law school was a
proprietary one, founded by Judge Tapping Reeve in Litchfield,
Connecticut, in 1784, which operated until 183-3.
A number of
proprietary law schools operated on the Litchfield model in the early
19th century. Instruction in these schools, as well as in the early college
law departments, was intensely practical, essentially like apprenticeship
in the classroom. No state required attendance at any kind of law school
at that time or, indeed, until nearly 1930.
Harvard is generally credited with having the first college law school
in 1817, with Chief Justice Isaac Parker of Massachusetts as a part-time
professor and then in 1829 with Justice Joseph Story of the United States
Supreme Court as a part-time professor. Other law schools were
established at various colleges, including Yale, Princeton, George
Washington, Tulane, North Carolina, and, perhaps the most successful,
Transylvania, between 1817 and, say, 1850. They carme and went. Their
level of instruction was similar to that in the proprietary schools.
Professors were mostly part-time judges or practitioners. Law schools
were attended by relatively few students, as an adjunct to apprenticeship.
States relied upon the bar examination as the ultimate qualification for
practice, as they still do. During the mid-1800's, qualifications for
practice actually declined.
Modem university law schools had their first stirrings in the 1850s or
1860s, at which time we also find a resurgence of proprietary law
schools. There was an increased demand for lawyers, which the
universities were eager to meet. The movement in legal education was
part of a larger movement to attach other professional schools,
4. The sketch of colonial legal education is drawn from William B. Stoebuck, Reception of
English Common Law in the American Colonies, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 393, 404-05, 413-15
(1968).
5. The sketch of the development of American legal education that follows is drawn mostly from
J. Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law, Ch. 12 (1950); Robert B. Stevens, Law School,
Passim (1983); John T. Gaubatz, Of Moots, Legal Process, and Learning to Learn the Law, 37 U.
Miami L. Rev. 473 (1983); and M. H. Hoeflich, Plus ca Change, Plus c'est la Meme Chose: The
Integration of Theoiy & Practicein Legal Education, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 123 (1993).
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particularly medicine, engineering, and divinity, to universities.
Historians generally trace the pattern for the modem law school to 1870,
when Harvard hired Christopher Columbus Langdell from practice to be
its full-time law dean. He is famous for the case method of study, but I
want to focus on another event in his deanship. In 1873, Harvard hired
James Barr Ames as a full-time professor of law. In Robert Stevens's
words, "The appointment of James Barr Ames ... was considered a
milestone. He was the first of a new breed of academic lawyer, a law
graduate with limited experience of practice who was appointed for his
scholarly and teaching potential."6
The American Bar Association (ABA), formed in 1878 to elevate the
profession, took an intense interest in legal education, an interest that
abides today. A team effort developed between the ABA and the
university law schools. Whereas many or most university law schools
did not require any college as a prerequisite when the ABA was formed,
today a college degree is a practical, if not always a formal, requirement
for admission. Most states require law school graduation to sit for the
bar examination, though a few, including Washington, still accept law
office apprenticeship as a rarely used alternative. The ABA conducted a
long struggle with proprietary law schools, which the ABA has largely
won. Proprietary schools, usually evening schools, flourished until the
1950s; around 1920, there were more law students in unaccredited
proprietary law schools than in ABA-accredited schools. Proprietary
schools still operate, particularly in the more populous states like
California, but they are not the major player in legal education they once
were. The vast majority of lawyers today, and nearly all leaders of the
bar, are graduates of accredited university law schools.
I have sketched the history of legal education to establish some
propositions for my main subject. Legal education began in England as
an apprenticeship system, with the crib and the Year Books. In England,
legal education has continued to be, and is today, under the control of the
branches of the profession and more vocationally oriented than in
America. In America, from office apprenticeships in the colonies, legal
education has evolved into a system in which professional law schools,
attached to universities, hold a near-monopoly. Perhaps I will be
excused a little chauvinistic pride if I say that I believe-and some
contemporary English observers agree-that our system produces on the
whole better lawyers than theirs.

6. Robert B. Stevens, Law School 38 (1983).
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Looking back into recent history, we all know that the past 20 or 25
years-a generation now-have been ones of much change in, not so
much the form, as the content of American legal education. We are in a
period of deep introspection. Or maybe we are, in Kenneth Pye's words,
"at a point midway between introspection and self-flagellation." 7 In
doing the reading for this lecture, I was amazed at the volume of writing
by American lawyers and legal educators about legal education in the
past few years.8 Just now, much attention is focused on the so-called
MacCrate Report, the report of the ABA Task Force on Law Schools and
the Profession headed by Robert MacCrate, recent president of the ABA.
I have read large parts of the report and also comments on it by Mr.
MacCrate and others.9 The Report is all about "skills and values" for
"the profession of law." It elaborately builds up descriptions of
necessary skills and values.1 0 There is obvious concern, even a sense of
urgency, that lawyers, especially newly admitted ones, too often lack
these skills and values. Concerning law schools, two everarching themes
are clear: (1) law school education is not sufficiently pointed toward the
legal profession" and (2) law schools are not sufficiently inculcating the
professional skills and values. The Report is vague on just how law
schools should teach these. Apparently the Task Force would have them
pervade the curriculum. One can read the Report to call for more clinical
programs, yet one of the recommendations suggests a quite limited role
for such programs. 12 The Task Force recommends--and this raises
eyebrows in academic circles-that the ABA Section of Legal Education

7. A. Kenneth Pye, Legal Education in an Era of Change: The Challenge, 1987 Duke L.J. 191,
199 n. 22.
8. A good overview of currents in, and writing about, contemporary American legal education is
David Bamnhizer, The Revolution in American Law Schools, 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 227 (1989).
9. Section on Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, American Bar Ass'n, Legal Education and
ProfessionalDevelopment-An EducationalContinuum (Report of the Task Force on Law Schools
and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992) [hereinafter MacCrateReport ]; John J.Costonis, The
MacCrateReport: OfLoaves, Fishes, and the FutureofAmerican Legal Education, 43 J. Leg. Educ.
157 (1993); Robert MacCrate, A Fresh Look at Lawyers'Education,27 U. Rich. L. Rev. 21 (1992).
10. Discussion of the "skills" and "values" American lawyers need pervades the entire report.
See, especially, MacCrateReport, supranote 9, Part Two.
11. Pointedly, MacCrateReport, supra note 9, at 330, recommendation 2, wants Standard 301(a)
for law school accreditation changed, so as to require a law school not ory to prepare its graduates
to pass the bar examination, also to "participate effectively in the legal profession."
12. MacCrateReport, supra note 9, at 332, recommendation 15, says "clinical programs should
help students understand the importance of the skill of 'organization and management of legal
work,' although it will remain for the first employer or mentor to translate that awareness into...
practiceexperience." (emphasis added).
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and Admission to the Bar, which accredits law schools, should adopt
standards requiring "skills and values instruction."' 3
An article that has much provoked my thinking is Judge Harry T.
Edwards's 1992 Michigan Law Review article, entitled The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession.4 It has
caused a firestorm of comment, since Judge Edwards came to the Second
Circuit after a distinguished academic career. I have read with interest
Judge Richard A. Posner's and Professor George L. Priest's critical
replies to what Priest calls Judge Edwards's "lively essay."' 5 Judge
Edwards's particular target-which is not my central focus today, though
I share much of his concern-is the law reviews: much of the writing,
especially in the elite reviews, is useless to the legal profession and in
particular, as you might guess, to judges. He divides scholarship into
that which is "practical," that is, "prescriptive" and "doctrinal," directed
toward the profession; and that which is "impractical," which is wholly
theoretical, and "ignores the applicable sources of law."' 6 In particular,
he singles out Critical Legal Studies and interdisciplinary scholars as
purveyors of "impractical" writing. He says, "I wholly reject the
'graduate school' model of legal education."' 7 You can see a concern
that Judge Edwards and the ABA Task Force share: they feel that
academic legal work today is not sufficiently directed toward the
profession.
While I too share some of Judge Edwards's concerns, I do not wholly
subscribe to some of his characterizations. To me, the distinction is not
between "practical" and "impractical," or "theoretical" and
"untheoretical" scholarship.
Judge Posner's phrase, "law as an
autonomous discipline" captures the essential difference better for me. 8
As Posner says, traditional legal scholarship, from the time of Langdell
onward, at least good legal scholarship, has been "theoretical." But
theory is worked out within the history and principles of law as an
autonomous discipline or, as I might put it, from a perspective within the
13. MacCrateReport, supranote 9, at 330, recommendation 3.
14. 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).
15. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalizationof Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 Mich.
L. Rev. 1921 (1993); George L. Priest, The Growth of InterdisciplinaryResearch and the Industrial
Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1929
(1993).
16. Edwards, supranote 14, at 38,42-44,46.
17. Edwards, supranote 14, at 40.
18. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline ofLaw as an Autonomous Discipline, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
761 (1987).
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legal system. Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous book, The Common
Law, is certainly regarded as "theoretical," but it draws upon sources and
reaches conclusions that are peculiarly within the domain of lawyers and
legal scholars. To be sure, the traditional legal scholar is informed about
society and often measures law and legal institutions by that knowledge,
but it professes to be only the knowledge that intelligent, educated
persons generally have. The scholar is not examiting law and legal
institutions as an outsider, as a biologist might examine a bug under a
microscope, but as a participant in the system.
Within the past generation, fashions in American legal scholarship
have changed enormously. One like myself, whose legal education
occurred when traditional legal scholarship was the mode, and who still
works in that genre, is poignantly aware of the trends. Judge Edwards
complains, not that the newer forms of legal scholarship should not exist
or that, done well, they are illegitimate, but of their dominance in
academic circles. But beyond that, he gives evidence that, especially in
elite law journals and leading law schools, it has become outr6 to work in
more traditional ways, for instance, in doctrinal analysis. He has been
criticized for basing his reliance upon anecdotal evidence, though the
critic does not doubt Edwards's general observations. 9 Anyone familiar
with contemporary legal education, especially a faculty member, knows
that acclaim, promotion, and tenure at the more prestigious law schools
come more easily to faculty who engage in the newer forms of
scholarship than in traditional, doctrinal work.
It is not my purpose to analyze the content of the newer forms of
scholarship; I am moving on to another point. I do nat regard myself as
expert in any discipline other than law, not even in legal history, where I
dabble a bit. But I am aware of some observations others have made
about interdisciplinary studies. A frequent observation is that, while
some law teachers who write in that idiom are well qualified to do
scholarship in the "other" discipline, many are not."0 Law teachers who
write from the perspective of some other discipline should have their
work evaluated by good scholars in that discipline fo:7, say, decisions on
promotion and tenure. Then, too, interdisciplinary studies have made,
19. See Posner, supra note 15, at 1930 n. 3.
20. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 14, at 36 ("mediocre interdisciplinary articles'); Richard A.
Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1647, n. 15 ("much of it [new scholarship] is
embarrassingly bad"). Reflect also upon David Barnhizer's observation that legal scholars, being
trained as advocates, bring an advocative cast to their writing, which is contrary to the tradition of
neutrality of scholarship in other disciplines. David Barnhizer, The Reolution in American Law
Schools, 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 227,235-39 (1989).
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and have the capacity to make, greater contributions in some areas of law
than in others and on some kinds of questions than on others.2' Even
Judge Edwards values the insights of interdisciplinary studies when the
writing is directed toward the resolution of what he calls "very hard"
cases.' His complaint is that, especially in the more prestigious law
reviews and schools, the balance has swung too far over to his
"impractical" scholars. He has much common ground with the MacCrate
Report: both feel that legal education should be professionally directed.
Concerning the Critical Legal Studies movement, I have more
difficulty seeing its contribution to legal education than I do that of the
interdisciplinary scholars. Again, it is not my purpose on this occasion
to critique the content, or lack of content, of critical studies. Many others
have, to borrow a word from the critical scholars, done a lot of "trashing"
of their ideas and their methods.' They are generally accused of being
Marxist and nihilist. In a former life, I was a student of Marxism, and I
think they are incomplete Marxists. Critical scholars deconstruct other
schools of thought, but they offer no coherent replacement. Marxists,
who similarly preach the disintegration of existing society, at least have,
or had, a vision of a new world, though now seen to be false. Like the
Marxists, the Critical Legal Studies scholars see the thesis and antithesis
of the Hegelian trilogy, but, unlike Marxists, they do not see any
synthesis. One thing is certain, a scholar who believes that the legal
system is a total fraud cannot be very professionally oriented.
In any discussion of contemporary legal education, someone is sure to
point out that the clinical movement is professionally directed. I
acknowledge that there are cross-currents in legal education and that
clinical experiences do provide professional skills training. But I would
note that other motivations also fuel the clinical movement, which came
out of social justice concerns of the early 1970s; the movement was quite
politicized.24 To provide services to underprivileged groups and to raise
the level of student consciousness remain as much the clinical purpose as

21. See Posner, supranote 20, at 1647.
22. See Edwards, supranote 14, at 43-45.
23. See, e.g., Arthur Austin, The Greening of the Law-Anarchy and Elegance: More Anarchy
than Elegance, 28 Idaho L. Rev. 213 (1991-1992); Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J.
Legal Educ. 222 (1984); Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
247 (1984); Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through DarkestCLS-Land, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
413 (1984). A less critical review of critical legal studies, putting them in context with other forms
of legal scholarship, is in Barnhizer, supra note 20. A discussion of"trashing" and other techniques
used by critical scholars will be found in Mark G. Kelman, Trashing,36 Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1984).
24. See Barnhizer, supranote 20, at 266.
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to train in practice skills.'
Critical legal scholars welcome clinical
programs, not because they develop practice skills per se, but because
they "empower students to avoid traditional law ffim jobs. 2 6 So, even
clinical studies, as they have developed, are not purely practice skills
courses.
Let me now state in plain my concern with some of the recent
developments in legal education. I am concerned, with Judge Edwards,
about a "disjunction" between legal education and the legal profession,
but my concern is with something of which law review writing is only
one reflection. It is with underlying assumptions. What we do as legal
educators-what we teach, what we write, what we are as legal
educators-all comes from the way we conceive of our purpose, our role,
and that of university law schools. Over and over again the words
"graduate school model" or some variant of that phrase appear in the
literature.2 7 When that label is used, it is clear that the writer is referring
to some of the newer modes of legal scholarship, chiefly interdisciplinary
work and critical legal studies.
Those legal scholars who have produced the trend toward the
"graduate school model" tend, in varying degrees, I am sure, to reject the
traditional professional role of the law school. This is a recent
phenomenon.
Legal educators, and certainly the public and the
profession, have viewed law schools, like professional schools of
medicine, dentistry, religion, and engineering, as different from, and with
different purposes than, the academic departments: in the university but
not fully ofthe university. I believe most legal educators still accept that

25. See, e.g., Leslie Newman, Law Schools and Community Economc Development (unpublished
manuscript 1993) (in my files), which reports on a number of clinical programs in community
economic development; Howard S. Erlanger & Gabrielle Lessard, Mobilizing Law Schools in
Response to Poverty:A MacCrateReport on Experiments in Progress,43 J. Legal Educ. 199 (1993),
describing poverty law courses with a clinical component, designed to sansitize students.
26. See Paul Brest, A First-Year Course in the "Lawyering Process," 32 J. Legal Educ. 344
(1982) (describing a required first-year simulated clinical course he and William Simon taught at
Stanford Law School); Kelman, supra note 23, at 300.
27. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supranote 20, at 263 ("what university scholarship in law would be if the
LangdellianABA paradigm had never been constructed"); Edwards, supra note 14, at 40 ("the
'graduate school' model of legal education"); Hoeflich, supra note 5, at 141 n.86 ("many law
professors. . redefined their roles to be more like humanities or social science faculty"); Posner,
supra note 18, at 779 ("the study of law not as a means of acquiring conventional professional
competence but 'from the outside"); Posner, supra note 20, after n.17 ("Law curricula would
become more practical. Room would thereby be created for true graduate departments of legal
studies.... .'); Pye, supranote 7, at 199 n.25 ("One law professor [George L. Priest] sees the need to
transform the law school into a self-contained university with a set of miniature graduate
departments. ... ').
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role, but it is the drift toward a changed conception about which I am
concerned.
To the extent law faculties are tending to become, and to believe they
should become, less professionally oriented, to that extent they abandon
the role that university law schools struggled to attain in America.
Perhaps James Barr Ames's appointment at Harvard marks the beginning
of an inevitable tendency in our system, that law teachers gradually
assume more the role of academicians, losing their sense of identity with
the profession. I am sure that many of the interdisciplinary and critical
scholars feel little affinity with the profession.
My concern is that we-the university law schools-will lose it. Our
society will have lawyers, and someone will prepare them for their
professional work. To the extent university law schools create a vacuum,
then someone else will do it. There is an implicit threat of this in the
MacCrate Report: clearly the Task Force has some dissatisfaction with
how university law schools are preparing students for professional work
and is calling on the profession to take over some of the preparation.
Suppose we were to become graduate schools in which the purpose, or
the main purpose, was to explore the role of law and the legal system in
government and society. For one thing, this would not serve our own
selfish interests. Law professors have a very enviable position in
American universities; because we are academics who are part of another
profession, we enjoy the pleasures of university life, but we are promoted
faster and paid better than faculty in the purely academic departments.
Do we sincerely want to become pure academics? But I hope our
Would the legal system,
ultimate concern is more principled.
government, and society be better off if someone else, the practicing
profession and no doubt proprietary law schools, replaced us as the
providers of lawyers? Do we want American legal education to go back
to the crib?
What would I have us do about my concerns? Since my thesis is that
the threat to university legal education is one of attitudes and values, my
purpose is only to persuade and not to prescribe. I suppose there are a
number of actions law faculties could take to foster professionalism in
university legal education. We could give more weight to professional
experience in the hiring, promotion, and tenuring of faculty. We could
give more credit for teachers' professional activities. We could have a
higher regard for traditional modes of legal scholarship. A Canadian
study recommended two separate kinds of law study, one professional
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and the other academic.28 But I have not thought much about what
actions we could take, and I do not want to dwell on them. To affect
attitudes about university law schools and the profession is my purpose.
Having expressed my concerns, I now have to make a confession: I
have a concern about my concerns. There is little danger of this in
today's climate, but I certainly do not want American lawyers to be
merely legal technicians, mechanics of the law. A strength of our
profession for hundreds of years, here and in England, is that lawyers
have been leaders in government and society; this peculiarly marks our
profession. Good lawyers are persons whose intelligence, broad liberal
education, combined with a lawyer's directivity, specially equips them
for leadership at every level of society. I do not wart to lose or diminish
their capacity or inclination for this kind of service. Therefore, while I
want our lawyers to have a rigorous professional legal education, I also
want them to have a broad, liberal education, especially in the humanities
and social sciences. Especially, I want them to appreciate deeply the role
of the law and the legal system in society. In the idiom of the day, I want
my lawyers to "have it all."
And I have a modest suggestion, which, as far as ] know, is original in
the context in which I am speaking. How about law schools requiring as
prerequisites to admission a core of specified undergraduate courses
whose special focus is on the role of law and the legal system from the
perspective of other disciplines? I have not worked out the details, but I
am thinking of a core of perhaps six prerequisite courses. These would
have the opposite function of the six core courses English legal
professions require; their courses are basic law courses; mine are
intensely academic courses in the humanities and social sciences. For
instance, we might require a political science course on the legal
system's role in government, a history course on the role of the legal
system in American history, and a sociology course focusing on the
capacity of the legal system to order social groups. To a considerable
extent these courses could be built upon existing courses, but the focus
and purpose would be different. It would be a sort of pre-law
curriculum, but of course not as extensive as the required pre-medical
curriculum. I think college students would readily accept this; you hear
them talk about being "pre-law majors" now, thcugh they are really
history, music, or engineering majors. They would come to us ready to
28. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Law and Learning 140-44,
154-57 (1983). This report advocates "pluralism in Canadian legal education," "university law
faculty... with non-professional goals," and "alternative curriculums."
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see their law subjects in the larger scheme of society. There would be
problems to work out, but I have confidence that a law faculty that is
clever enough to put a law school on the semester system in a quartersystem university could solve them. Many law school professors who
now teach interdisciplinary courses in law school would probably want
to teach similar courses inmy core curriculum, especially if they were
qualified for joint appointments in the offering departments. One
additional feature that I think is worth serious consideration would be to
have in law school a first-year "bridge" course. It would be something
like a processes course, but specifically designed to bridge the
undergraduate core curriculum to law school courses.
Let me close on this note: I want to preserve American legal education
in its chosen role, professional schools attached to universities. This
American innovation has proven a superior way to populate a profession
that is both professionally competent and alive to the broader purposes of
society. My concern is that if legal education too much strays from its
professional role, the enormous and elevating influence we have had on
the profession and, through the profession, on all of society, will be lost
or curtailed. Others with more parochial outlook will take over. Even if
it means some legal scholars do not pursue their scholarship into more
academic, more speculative, realms, the compromise will be worth it.
The same hand that wrote, "Half a loaf is better than none" also wrote,
"Better to bow than to break."29

29. John Heywood, Proverbes, Part I, Ch. 9, Ch. 11 (1546), as quoted in John Bartlett, Familiar
Quotations90 (13th ed. 1955).

